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Abstract
In 1982-83 a small group of Cape Breton landowners and two Indian chiefs, with wide-spread public support
took the multi-national forest industry to court in Nova Scotia; and lost Their objective was to obtain an
injunction to prevent the spraying of a dioxin-contaminated herbicide on forest plantations near their homes
and properties and those of their neighbours The case raised important environmental law issues including
the use of class actions, reliance upon common law causes of action, and the availability of injunctive remedies
Most significantly, the case brought to the fore the question of how the judicial system should handle the
deliberate release of toxic chemicals into the environment when uncertainty existed concerning the impact
this activity would have. In this article the author provides background to the case and analyzes the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court decision. He concludes that future plaintiffs in a similar position should win on existing
legal theory. Finally, Professor Wildsmith suggests an alternative approach that judges could and should within
an evolving common law system, take to adjust the burden of proof in cases concerning the use of toxic
chemicals.
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OF HERBICIDES AND HUMANKIND:
PALMER'S COMMON LAW LESSONS
BY BRUCE H. WILDSMITH*
In 1982-83 a small group of Cape Breton landowners and two Indian chiefs, with
wide-spread public support took the multi-national forest industry to court in Nova
Scotia; and lost Their objective was to obtain an injunction to prevent the spraying
of a dioxin-contaminated herbicide on forest plantations near their homes and
properties and those of their neighbours The case raised important environmental
law issues including the use of class actions, reliance upon common law causes of
action, and the availability of injunctive remedies Most significantly, the case brought
to the fore the question of how the judicial system should handle the deliberate release
of toxic chemicals into the environment when uncertainty existed concerning the impact
this activity would have. In this article the author provides background to the case
and analyzes the Nova Scotia Supreme Court decision. He concludes that future
plaintiffs in a similar position should win on existing legal theory. Finally, Professor
Wildsmith suggests an alternative approach that judges could and should within an
evolving common law system, take to adjust the burden of proof in cases concerning
the use of toxic chemicals.
I. INTRODUCTION
... as I understand it... the judge concluded that there was not enough evidence
to decide that the use of that particular type of herbicide was harmful. From
the knowledge that I have of the law, it seems to me that until the question of
the proof of onus [sic] is shifted from where it stands now to the individual or
to the group that initiates the utilization of a new product, this type of decision
will continue to take place.1
On September 15, 1983, Mr. Justice Merlin Nunn rendered his
judgment in the controversial Nova Scotia herbicide spraying case, Palmer
v. Nova Scotia Forest Industries.2 In a mammoth decision, 182 pages
typescript, he refused to grant an injunction to prevent the spraying of
herbicides containing the chemicals 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D and awarded costs
to the defendant. Additionally, the court was prepared to hear arguments
@ Copyright, 1986, Bruce H. Wildsmith.
* B.Sc. (Guelph), LL.B. (Dal.), LL.M. (Harv.), Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie
University, Halifax, N.S.
I Hon. Charles L. Caccia, Minister of the Environment (Canada), House of Commons Debates
(27 September 1983) at 27501.
2 (1983), 60 N.S.R. (2d) 271, 26 C.C.L.T. 22, 12 C.E.L.R. 157, 2 D.L.R. (4th) 397 (S.C.).
All citations will be to the report of the case in the N.S.R.'s.
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on the question of damages claimed by the defendant as a result of
an earlier interim injunction that had prevented it from spraying in 1982,
and perhaps in 1983.3
For many observers, the plaintiffs loss of the case, coupled with
liability for costs and damages, demonstrates the futility of using the
courts as a mechanism of environmental protection. In my view,4 the
decision in Palmer should not be seen in this light for at least three
reasons. First, the trial generated enormous media attention. There was
national coverage in Canada in magazines such as Maclean's, newspapers
such as the The Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, and the Ottawa Citizen,
and on television, including the CBC's The Journal. In the United States 5
articles appeared in the New York Times and NBC provided U.S.-wide
television coverage. Even European sources covered the issue.6 Locally,
virtually all the newspapers and both the CBC and Atlantic television
networks provided almost daily coverage of the trial and surrounding
events. The National Film Board made a one-hour documentary, "Her-
3 The claim for damages stems from undertakings given by the plaintiffs to secure the
interlocutory injunction. The undertakings provide that the plaintiffs would indemnify the defendant
for any loss suffered as a result of the issue of the interim injunction if the action for a permanent
injunction failed. Mr. Justice Denne Burchell's decision granting the interlocutory injunction is reported
in (1982), 53 N.S.R. (2d) 278 (S.C.). The grant of the interlocutory injunction was appealed by
the defendant and the Appeal Division set it aside in December in an oral decision. Because the
provincial licences required before spraying could legally take place were about to expire, no spraying
could effectively take place before the following summer, and "[i]t is apparent that full and proper
trial of the issues herein can and should be held well before next summer." See (1982), 58 N.S.R.(2d) 191 at 192. The trial in fact took place in May, 1983, with some argument heard and concluding
briefs submitted in early June. Since Nunn J. did not render his decision until mid-September and
the defendant did not spray at the sites in question in 1983, it was arguable that the plaintiffs
may have been responsible for damages flowing from the failure to spray for two years rather
than only one.
4 The reader should appreciate that the author assisted the plaintiffs as counsel from the fall
of 1982 through until the conclusion of the trial proceedings in September of 1983. He was not
involved at the outset in events leading to the interim and interlocutory injunctions or in the post-
trial decision not to appeal and to settle questions relating to costs and damages.
5 It should be remembered that at the time in the U.S., 2,4,5-T was still the subject of controversy.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had suspended the use of 2,4,5-T for forestry applications,
subject to reconsideration through a judicial-style inquiry. The major chemical manufacturers,
including Dow Chemical of Midland, Michigan, were contesting this decision. Many of the experts
involved in the Palmer case also had involvement, or were expected to have involvement, in these
hearings. Similarly, the U.S. Veterans' class action case based on the exposure of soldiers to Agent
Orange during the Vietnam War was at that time under litigation and on the verge of going to
trial. The trial was expected to open in June of 1983, but was adjourned and the case was eventually
settled.
6 Interest in Europe stemmed from a variety of reasons, including the involvement of Micmac
Indians, and the facts that the defendant was a Nova Scotia branch of a large Swedish multi-
national forest company, that one of the plaintiffs' leading expert witnesses was a Swedish doctor,
and that major fund raising efforts were conducted in Sweden.
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bicide Trials." Harrowsmith described the event as the "Judgement Day
for Agent Orange." 7 While the media coverage may be described, in
some cases, as over-simplified and sensationalist it is clear that in many
respects the court challenge heightened public awareness of the problem
of toxic-chemical pollution, which, regardless of the merits of the Palmer
decision, is serious. In the process, the judiciary and other members of
the legal community, the politicians and the government regulators
themselves were forced to take stock of the problem and their role in
relation to toxic chemicals. The educational value of the court challenge
must not be underestimated.
Second, in a pragmatic sense, the plaintiffs won the case. They lost
the battle to persuade Mr. Justice Nunn, but won the war over spraying
2,4,5-T in Nova Scotia. At the eleven spray sites involved in the case,
2,4,5-T was not sprayed in 1982. No permits were granted to spray
2,4,5-T anywhere in Nova Scotia in 1983; neither was it sprayed in
1984 or 1985. It appears that in the aftermath of the trial, despite Nunn
J.'s statement that "this court is of the opinion that these spraying
operations can be carried out in safety and without risk to the health
of the citizens of this province,"8 the political and regulatory decision
makers in Nova Scotia and the forestry companies and other users have
decided not to pursue the matter. Perhaps they have been influenced
by the ultimate counterpoint to the court outcome: a matter of weeks
after the Nova Scotia decision the major supplier of 2,4,5-T products,
Dow Chemical in Midland, Michigan, announced it would no longer
market products containing 2,4,5-T and the u.s. Environmental Protection
Agency totally banned the use of 2,4,5-T for any purpose in the United
States.9 The plaintiffs were vindicated in the larger arena, if not in the
courtroom.
Third, and most important for this article, the legal theory underlying
the plaintiffs' case remains intact and is strengthened in several respects.
The thesis of this paper is that the common law has more life than
is apparent to the casual reader of the decision of Nunn J.: it has retained
the vitality to provide potential relief against a proposed spraying operation
in a situation akin to Palmer. Perhaps the next time an injunction is
7 (April/May 1983) 7:6 Harrowsmith 125.
8 Supra, note 2 at 355.
9 See, eg., . Steed, "Spray Unleashes a Forest of Fear", The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (26
November 1983) 10.
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sought, the plaintiffs and their supporters will succeed in the judicial
forum. There is good reason to think that this should be so.
II. BACKGROUND
This case has numerous complexities,0 many of which are not
germane to understanding the legal issues surrounding similar spraying
situations.1 The gravamen in the case is that the defendant forest company
wished to spray herbicides on forest land that it either owned or leased
from the provincial government. The purpose of spraying was to chem-
ically weed its conifer plantations: in essence to retard the growth or
kill unwanted plants, including hardwoods, so that the softwoods, which
the company had planted or which had naturally regenerated, would
more quickly become dominant. This would speed up the production
cycle. Before releasing these chemicals into the environment of Nova
Scotia, Nova Scotia Forest Industries (NSFI) was required to obtain a
permit for each spray site under Nova Scotia's Environmental Protection
Act.12 These permits had been obtained. They authorized spraying only
from the ground, not from the air. Since this statute preserves common
law rights of action and remedies, t3 as long as the herbicides remained
on NSFI's land, it is difficult to see what private cause of action the
10 In addition to the decisions at trial, supra, note 2, and on the interlocutory injunction at
trial and on appeal, supra, note 3, there are two other reported decisions made in the context
of this case relating to costs. Originally the action was against three forestry companies and in
discontinuing the proceedings against one of them, that defendant, Scott Paper International Inc.,
became entitled to costs. The taxation of the bill of costs was appealed at (1983), 59 N.S.R. (2d)
216 (S.C.) and a further appeal from that decision is reported at (1983), 58 N.S.R. (2d) 193 (C.A.).
11 An exception to this concerns the use of juries. The plaintiffs in setting the matter down
for trial filed a jury notice. The defendant moved to strike the jury. The motion was heard by
Nunn J., who at this point had been assigned to deal with all matters relating to this case. In
an unreported decision, he granted the motion. He would not allow the case to be heard by the
jury on the basis that the evidence, especially that from scientific experts, would be too complicated
for a jury of laypeople to understand. In my view this perspective does not give enough credit
to the capacity of intelligent laypeople, especially when the trial judge does not have any more
obvious scientific expertise and in light of the fact that he retains the power at any point to withdraw
the case from the jury. The plaintiffs argued that despite extensive scientific evidence, neither the
jury nor a judge was going to resolve a scientific issue over which the scientific community is
itself split; in the final analysis the evidence would boil down to a common sense assessment on
whether the risk is acceptable. The decision to disallow a jury badly hurt the plaintiffs. Also, a
decision against them by a jury of peers would have been much more acceptable to the plaintiffs
and would have helped maintain their faith in democratic principles and our system of administering
justice.
12 S.N.S. 1973, c. 6, s. 23(1).
13 Ibid s. 55(1).
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plaintiffs would have against the defendant. 14 Therefore, a central as-
sumption of the plaintiffs' case was that the herbicides would escape.
The particular chemical that concerned the plaintiffs was Esteron
3-3E, a product manufactured by Dow Chemical. This phenoxy herbicide
is composed of 50 percent 2,4-D and 50 percent 2,4,5-T. A contaminant
in all 2,4,5-T is a particular dioxin isomer, 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-
p-dioxin, commonly called TCDD. Nunn J. stated: "The contaminant
TCDD is one of the most toxic chemicals known to man." 5 While TCDD
is the best known dioxin, there is controversy as to its detrimental effect
upon humans and the environment, especially when used in small
quantities. It is known that 2,4,5-T contains other isomers of dioxin besides
TCDD, as well as a variety of isomers of a similar group of chemicals
called furans. Much less is known about the other dioxins and the furans.
While much of the interest in the case stemmed from the sense that
2,4,5-T was on trial, it was not necessary to condemn the chemical in
order for the plaintiffs to succeed in establishing a cause of action. The
proper point in the proceeding at which to consider the risk posed by
2,4,5-T would be upon choosing appropriate remedies.
The plaintiffs, understandably, were concerned about the danger to
themselves and the environment from spraying 2,4,5-T. They were
motivated to act because of the particular chemicals involved. Yet there
may not exist a perfect symmetry between motivation and a legally
cognizable basis for complaint. Thus it is necessary to place the plaintiffs'
concerns into a legal framework acceptable to the court. The old forms
of action may no longer be mandatory, but the judicial system has yet
to abandon the notion that only certain complaints can give rise to a
judicially cognizable cause of action. Therefore, since not all issues,
decisions, or alleged wrongs are justiciable, an appropriate peg must
be found upon which to hang the plaintiffs' case.
Amazingly, we have yet to develop a legal theory giving us a
justiciable right to be free of toxic chemicals. Trespass to the person
is theoretically adequate for direct, deliberate physical invasions. Personal
injuries that can be linked to a defendant's negligent action or nuisance
may be recompensable. However, in the Palmer situation it would have
14 This is not to rule out the possibility of several grounds to challenge this on-site activity.
First, one might argue that the Minister of the Environment was in breach of his duty under the
Environmental Protection Act, supra, note 12, and that as a result the permits were invalidated.
Second, it can be, and was in Palmer, argued that Indians who have unextinguished aboriginal
rights in relation to the spray site can maintain an action for the effect the presence of toxic
chemicals would have on the exercise of their rights. Third, it may be that the public has a right
of access to the site, for example to hunt or fish, that similarly gives rise to a cause of action.
15 Supra, note 2 at 350.
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been clearly inadequate to base the action on a general notion that the
plaintiffs have a right to a safe environment.
If protection of humankind through notions of bodily integrity or
a safe environment is inadequate, we are thrown back to the one interest
that seems to enjoy universal protection: property. Obviously property
does not enjoy absolute protection, but the law has historically always
managed to develop causes of action rooted in protection of property.
It was to these notions of property that the plaintiffs turned.
All of the plaintiffs owned or occupied land in the vicinity of the
proposed spray sites or on watercourses downstream from the areas to
be sprayed. Each plaintiff was not necessarily the closest landowner or
resident to the spraying sites and there were others who also owned
land adjacent to these sites. In order to cover unknown factors or
contingencies related to wind or drift or runoff and to prevent the possibility
of only receiving a plaintiff-specific remedy, the suit was framed as a
representative or class action. The statement of claim then asserted six
causes of action: private nuisance; trespass to land; the rule in Rylands
v. Fletcher,16 the right of riparian owners to water undiminished in quality;
the right of landowners to ground water free of chemical contamination;
and breach of statute, especially of the environmental protection and
pollution control provisions of the Fisheries Act.'7 By way of relief, the
plaintiffs sought to prevent the spraying before it took place. Prevention
is particularly important when damage from the spraying would not likely
be obvious shortly after the spraying (latency periods measured in decades
may apply for such possible outcomes as cancer) and the potential injuries
are inherently uncompensable (birth defects and genetic damage as well
as cancer and environmental damage). A permanent injunction was
requested to accomplish this: the particular form sought was an anti-
cipatory injunction, commonly referred to as a quia timet injunction. The
plaintiffs also requested a declaration that they had the right to be free
of exposure to the phenoxy herbicide and "such other relief as this
Honourable Court thinks just."18
Palmer will likely prove to be a very influential environmental case
for the future. It is not, however, a decision that ought to be accepted
at face value in all respects. The balance of this article will emphasize
some of the ways in which the analysis in Palmer is flawed. In particular,
the article will focus on four weaknesses in the decision. First, the trial
judge correctly states the law on trespass to land but fails to apply this
16 (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
17 G.R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14.
18 See supra, note 2 at 343.
[VOL 24 NO. I
Of Herbicides and Humankind
law to the evidence before him. In other words, legal theory supports
a successful outcome for the plaintiffs here and in a future law suit
involving the spray of chemicals. On the evidence in Palmer, the plaintiffs
probably should have won. Second, Nunn J. explains the law of nuisance
incompletely and thereby fails to address some important questions. In
particular, he fails to consider the non-health aspects of herbicide spraying.
Third, he does not adequately address questions of relief. Fourth,
recognizing that a case of this nature poses severe problems related to
proof, a common law judge ought to deal with questions of risk and
uncertainty in a new way.
Ill. CLASS ACTION
Before turning to these four central issues, note should be taken
of the significance of the Palmer case from the standpoint of class actions.
Originally the proceeding was commenced by a group of plaintiffs
described as "CAPE BRETON LANDOWNERS and ELIZABETH MAY and
VICTORIA PALMER on their own behalves and on behalf of CHIEF RYAN
GOOGOO, REVEREND CHARLES MULLENDORE, JACK MAcGILLIVRAY,
ROBERT SANSON [sic], CHIEF THOMAS FRANCIS, and on behalf of all
persons in the Province of Nova Scotia who are opposed to the spraying
of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T for forestry purposes."19 The defendants, initially
three but later reduced to one because of problems with standing, opposed
the class action nature of the claim. As the description noted above
indicates, the claim had two suspect aspects to it. One is the idea that
one named plaintiff can bring a representative action on behalf of other
named individuals. Since the other named individuals (Googoo,
Mullendore, MacGillivray, Sanson, Francis) had all filed undertakings
with respect to discrete spray areas and were all represented by the same
counsel, it was not clear why the suit was not structured so that they
each sued on their own behalf as well.20 Second, expressing the class
as all persons in Nova Scotia who are opposed to the spraying introduced
a breadth to the class that does not seem meaningful and makes
identification of membership very difficult.
Mr. Justice Burchell orally held on August 10 during the ex parte
application for an interim injunction that a class action could be
maintained. He stated, "Pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 5.09(1), I
19 Supreme Court decision, supra, note 3.
20 Perhaps it was anticipated that GooGoo et at would be sheltered from liability for costs,
but the undertakings given by each of them would foreclose this possibility. The undertakings
included liability for costs as well as damages should the plaintiffs ultimately be unsuccessful.
See ibid at 280.
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accepted the standing of several of the plaintiffs, Victoria Palmer, Chief
Ryan GooGoo and Chief Thomas Francis, to represent other holders
of lands adjacent to spray areas." 21 The matter was further considered
on August 19 on the interpartes application for an interlocutory injunction.
Burchell J. states, "On the question of standing, I made essentially the
same ruling as before but I recognized the right of certain parties, as
downstream owners, to maintain an action relative to unauthorized
pollution of water sources in actual use." 22 In substance, Burchell J. al-
lowed the structure of the suit as a class action to stand unaltered. In
reality, however, he allowed a plaintiff to maintain standing in relation
to a particular spray site to which he or she was connected. The injunction
was not province-wide in application and did not affect spray sites at
other locations in the province.23
The defendant appealed the interlocutory decisions on the class nature
of the proceeding. The Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division,
delivering an oral decision through MacKeigan CJ.N.S., stated:
In view of Mr. Wildsmith's assurance that the originating notice and statement
of claim will be amended to provide that Victoria Palmer will represent only
landowners in the Lochaber district and that other persons will be named as
representative plaintiffs in respect of other areas, we need not consider the merits
of the application. We therefore dismiss this application.24
This should have made two points clear. One is that the theory underlying
the class action was that each spray site would define a separate class.
In other words, one named plaintiff could represent all landowners in
the vicinity of that spray site. Conversely, each spray site would require
its own plaintiff. Second, and most important, the Appeal Division was
in effect holding that a class action was an appropriate mechanism to
use in a spraying context.
Despite the Appeal Division's disposition of the class or representative
action issue, the defendant persisted in arguing to the trial judge that
a representative action was not proper, and Mr. Justice Nunn, who now
had charge of the case, entertained the argument. The trial judge finally
expressed his view on the subject in his final decision on September
15, 1983. There, after setting out Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rule
5.09(1),l5 Nunn J. notes that "this rule has two basic requirements -
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid at 281.
23 There was an undertaking by the defendants not to spray certain areas until the interlocutory
application was disposed of. See ibid
24 Appeal Division decision, supra, note 3 at 192.
25 5.09(1). "Where numerous persons have the same interest in a proceeding.., the proceeding
may be begun, and, unless the court otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one or more
of them as representing all or as representing all except one or more of them."
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numerous persons and the same interest."26 He stated there was "no
problem with the numerous person requirement ' 27 and focused on whether
those in the class had the same interest. In holding that they have the
same interest, he states, "Clearly the plaintiffs and those represented by
them have a common interest and a common grievance and the relief
sought is beneficial to all."28 This was so even though the mechanism
by which spray would reach members of the class might differ and the
probability of harm might vary from class member to class member.
He also reached this conclusion despite several adverse Ontario precedents
dealing with maintaining class actions where a nuisance is alleged.29This
aspect of Mr. Justice Nunn's decision must be applauded.
One ironic point, however, must be noted. Nunn J. remarks correctly
that the action is really a combination of a number of representative
actions. He therefore concludes:
It may have been more proper for the action of each group to have been brought
separately and all consolidated via consolidation of action procedure [quaere"
why go through a more complex procedure to achieve the same result?] or
perhaps one or more representatives could have represented all of the areas
together.30 [Emphasis added.]
Ironically, Nunn J. expresses a more liberal view on this issue than the
plaintiffs themselves had dared assert. The logic of the trial judge's
suggestion would have allowed one plaintiff to have represented all of
NSFI's spray sites throughout the province, not just those involved in
the actual case, and, perhaps by utilizing the notion of a representative
defendant, all forestry operations in Nova Scotia. Similarly, if an un-
dertaking with respect to costs and damages before granting an interim
or interlocutory injunction was required by the court, presumably only
one individual need undertake such personal exposure. It is also noteworthy
that this suggestion seems at odds with the position underlying the Appeal
Division's comments on amending the class descriptions to have a plaintiff
at each site. A further irony is that the plaintiffs kept resisting the
defendant's argument that a representative action was improper by
referring to the Appeal Division's decision. The trial judge had seemingly
ignored the Appeal Division and expressed a more liberal point of view.
What would have happened if the plaintiffs had, after the Appeal Division's
limiting decision, gone the course the trial judge suggested? Would they
26 Supra, note 2 at 337.
27 Ibid
28 Ibid. at 339.
29 Preston v. Hilton (1920), 55 D.L.R. 647 (Ont. S.C.); Turtle v. Toronto (1924), 56 O.L.R.
252 (C.A.); S Lawrence Rendering Co. v. Cornwall (1951), [1951] 4 D.L.R. 790 (Ont. H.C.).
30 Supra note 2 at 339.
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have been as free as the defendant and the trial judge in ignoring the
apparent resjudicata impact of the higher court's views?
In any event, all five judges, Burchell and Nunn JJ. MacKeigan
CJ.N.S., and Jones and Macdonald JJ.A., were of the view that a class
or representative plaintiffs action was proper. An important precedent
has been set.
IV. TRESPASS TO LAND
As in relation to class actions, Nunn J.'s views on the legal theory
underlying trespass to land are laudable. The application of the theory,
however, leaves much to be desired.
Nunn J. notes that trespass to land is actionable per se and does
not require proof of damage.3' He quotes from Salmond and Heuston
on The Law of Tors32 that it is a trespass to place anything upon the
plaintiffs land or to cause any physical object or noxious substance to
cross the boundary of the plaintiffs land. He includes an extensive quote
from a New Brunswick spraying case, Friesen v. Forest Protection Limited.33
Included in the quote is the following, per Dickson J.:
To throw a foreign substance on the property of another, and particularly in doing
so to disturb his enjoyment of his property, is an unlawful act. The spray deposited
here must be considered such a foreign substance, and its deposit unquestionably
amounted to a disturbance, however slight it may have been, of the owner's
enjoyment of their property. I therefore must conclude that the defendant, in
depositing the spray did in fact commit what would, in the absence of statutory
authority, be considered a trespass.34
Mr. Justice Nunn himself states, "again there is no doubt in my mind
that, if it is proved that the defendant permits any of these substances
on the plaintiffs' lands, it would constitute a trespass and be actionable."35
A very interesting aspect of the decision appears in the following
sentence quoted from Freisen, immediately following the above passage:
This of course does not involve any question of whether or not the spray may
have been toxic or non-toxic, because even to have thrown water or garbage
or snow or earth tippings, or any substance on the property would equally have
amounted to an act of trespass. 36
31 Ibid at 346.
32 18th ed. (Agincourt, Ontario: Carswell, 1981) at 39.
33 (1978), 22 N.B.IR (2d) 146 (Q.B.).
34 Supra, note 2 at 346.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid
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Thus, in terms of whether the plaintiffs had a legal cause of action,
questions of toxicity are irrelevant. It matters not if the chemicals are
'unsafe'. Water alone would suffice!
Why, then, did the plaintiffs not succeed on the basis of trespass
to land? The only explanation offered by Nunn J. is contained in two
comments. He concludes his discussion of trespass to land by stating,
"Again, entitlement to a remedy, will be based upon proof as to whether
such substance will be deposited on the lands of the plaintiff."37 At this
point in the decision, there is no reference to whether or not such proof
was present. Only once thereafter in his decision does Mr. Justice Nunn
come back to the issue of trespass. There he states, "As to trespass,
none has been proved as probable to occur. Possibilities do not constitute
proof."38 At one very important level, the learned trial judge's discussion
is significant because it confirms the plaintiffs' legal theory: if the spray
drifted from the defendant's spray sites to the plaintiffs' lands, the
defendant will have committed an actionable wrong. The ostensible reason
the plaintiffs failed was lack of proof. Mr. Justice Nunn's discussion is
deficient because it does not deal with what obviously is a very critical
issue: the likelihood of the defendant being able to spray without the
chemical drifting onto the plaintiffs' lands. Nunn J. discusses extensively
the evidence on the health risks posed by 2,4,5-T, but does not adequately
discuss the possibility of drift.
Little would be gained by reviewing in detail the evidence presented
to the trial judge concerning possible drifting of the toxic spray. On
the summary of evidence presented in the decision, though, the plaintiffs'
case seems persuasive. The herbicide could only legally be sprayed in
accordance with the instructions printed on the label, and this specified
only spraying when the wind is "above calm" and below eight kilometers
per hour. The only meteorologist and weather forecaster to testify stated
that it was impossible to predict winds within these limitsa9 and that
even with a trained and experienced meteorologist on site "it would
be almost impossible to forecast periods sufficiently long enough to make
the completion of the spray program possible."40 This view was not
contradicted. As well an Environmental Protection Service employee,
William Ernst, testified that a 1981 study on drift during forestry herbicide
use in Nova Scotia indicated "that both in aerial and ground spray
applications there was a drift of the chemicals depositing them on areas
37 Ibid
38 Ibid at 355.
39 Ibid at 282.
40 Ibid at 283.
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beyond the blocks sprayed." 41 Indeed, at one point during the trial
proceedings, the trial judge said to the plaintiffs' counsel:
Look, I'm, I'm not so sure that we're not using science to... really portray what
is obvious. You know, if you take a fly sprayer and you do it in the wind, the
wind is going.., to move the spray. You don't have to, you don't have to pound
that one too hard for me to accept it as a - as a fact. There obviously is a
direct relationship between wind and drift in anything - that will feather up into
the air on a windy day and it'll move farther than it may on a calm day.42
To this, the plaintiffs' counsel responded: "It's not necessary for me to
go through with evidence of that type."43
As indicated in the discussion above, off-site drift was not a mere
possibility, even a probability, but rather a virtual certainty. Since the
plaintiff classes represented all surrounding landowners and some in-
dividual plaintiffs were in close proximity to the sites, it is hard to see
how the trial judge could have reached the conclusion he did on the
issue of trespass to land.
V. NUISANCE
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word "nuisance". It has meant all things to all people, and has
been applied indiscriminately.... Few terms have afforded so excellent an
illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catchword as
a substitute for any analysis of a problem....44
Exception cannot be taken with the statements made by Nunn J.
on the law of nuisance, 45 as far as they go. He quotes, for example,
that the "essence of the tort of nuisance is interference with the enjoyment
of land."46 The important element of the law of nuisance for him, though,
is that "only some substantial interference with a person's enjoyment
of property gives rise to an action in nuisance." 47 There is no analysis
of what is meant by "substantial interference." Nunn J. finesses this
problem by reasoning that is, with respect, suspect. He indicates that
the plaintiffs were concerned about the possible human health effects
of the chemicals, and concludes that "[a]s a serious risk of health, if
41 Ibid at 286.
42 This was during the direct examination of William Ernst: Trial Transcript at 233.
43 Ibid at 234.
44 Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1984)
at 616.
45 See supra, note 2 at 345.
46 Ibid., quoting from Street on Tort 5th ed. (London: Butterworth, 1972) at 212.
47 Ibid
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proved, there would be no doubt that such an interference would be
substantial."'48 This is undoubtedly so. But he then states:
In other words, the grounds for the cause of action in nuisance exist here provided
that the plaintiffs prove the defendant will actually cause it, i.e., that the chemicals
will come to the plaintiffs' lands and that it will actually create a risk to their
health.49
Put differently, Nunn J. is saying that since a serious health risk is a
substantial interference, if the plaintiffs prove it they have succeeded.
He then assumes that the negative is equally true, that is, if the plaintiffs
do not prove a serious health risk, they lose. In logic this is called the
fallacy of denying the antecedent.5 0 This is a very serious logical error.
With respect, the trial judge ought to have considered, in light of his
finding on the health issue, what was meant by a "substantial interference"
and whether this nevertheless existed. In other words, something less
than a serious health risk might nevertheless amount to a nuisance.
Ultimately deciding what amounts to a "substantial interference"
is a matter of judgment. In most cases, when the physical condition of
the plaintiffs land is impacted, there is a substantial interference.5 1 In
contrast, an impact on the person's use and enjoyment of land should
be measured in terms of its objective effect on the ordinary comfort
of human existence.5 2 Without belabouring the point, one cannot help
noting that the chemicals in question were herbicides, designed to harm
or kill living plants. As well, Nunn J. states that the "contaminant TCDD
[contained in 2,4,5-T] is one of the most toxic chemicals known to man.
One witness described it as 'exquisitely toxic'." 53 If a neighbour was
48 Ibid
49 Ibid
50 The fallacy of denying the antecedent is explained in W.C. Salmon, Logic (Toronto: Prentice-
Hall, 1963) at 27-28. An argument displaying this logic has this form:
If p, then q.
Not -p.
.*. Not -q.
An example given by Salmon is the following:
If Columbia University is in California, then it is in the United States.
Columbia University is not in California.
.*. Columbia University is not in the United States.
Putting Mr. Justice Nunn's argument in this form would give us the following:
If a serious health risk exists, then a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of
lands exists.
A serious health risk does not exist.
•*. A substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of lands does not exist.
51 Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, supra, note 44 at 627.
52 Ibid at 627-28.
53 Supra, note 2 at 350.
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spraying such a substance next door, would the normal person not consider
the ordinary comfort of existence affected?
VI. RELIEF
Ultimately, the plaintiffs wished to prevent the herbicide spraying.
To this end they claimed by way of relief a permanent injunction.
Injunctions have their own particular requirements that must be met before
being granted, and so to avoid the possibility of making out a cause
of action but failing on relief, the plaintiffs also claimed a declaration
and "such other relief as this Honourable Court thinksjust."54 Additionally,
damages could be considered in lieu of an injunction, as will be elaborated
on later.
Nunn J. deals first with the claim for a declaration which he concludes
is not within the power of the court to grant. His view is that the relief
"reaches the realm of a broad social right," that it is "a societal matter"
and that it is "not justiciable between these parties."55 The reason seems
to be that "exposure may come from any sources and in many different
situations," 56 For example, Nunn J. states that "[by] far the greatest amount
of phenoxy herbicides are used in agriculture and such a declaration
would have wide-spread ramifications in that industry without anyone
involved having been able.to present evidence or argument to this court."57
The problem with this approach to the question of granting a
declaration is that it assumes that too broad a declaration was sought.
Pitting the plaintiffs as against all the world poses more severe problems
in determining the existence of a legal right. But in the context of a
law suit against one particular defendant that proposed a discrete course
of action (that is, to spray particular chemicals on particular lands), the
more appropriate assumption is that any requested declaration would
relate only to the activities of the named defendant. Putting the issue
differently, all the plaintiffs sought was a declaration that they had the
right to be free of 2,4,5-T on their lands as a result of the activities
proposed by the defendant. What could be more justificable?58
54 Ibid at 342-43.
55 Ibid at 343.
56 Ibid
57 Ibid at 344.
58 It is perhaps of more than passing interest to note that the Bedford Service Commission
case relied upon by Nunn J. was reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada: (1977),
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 269. Laskin CJ.C. stated, at 270, that a declaratory action attacking the decision
as to where to locate a garbage dump did raise justiciable issues.
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Having disposed of the claim for a declaration, the only other form
of relief considered by Mr. Justice Nunn is the injunction. He states:
The plaintiffs must, however, prove the essential elements of a regular injunction,
namely irreparable harm and that damages are not an adequate remedy.... Finally,
any injunction is a discretionary remedy and sufficient grounds must be established
to warrant the exercise by the court of its discretion.... I am satisfied that a
serious risk to health, if proved, would constitute irreparable harm and that damages
would not be an adequate remedy. Further, recognizing the great width and elasticity
of equitable principles, I would have no hesitation in deciding that such a situation
would be one of the strongest which would warrant the exercise of the Court's
discretion to restrain the activity which would create the risk.59
Again, Nunn J. falls into the logical fallacy of denying the antecedent.
He wrongly assumes that if a serious risk to health would justify an
injunction, then negating the health risk also negates the injunction.60
Thus an important question that the court should have asked but did
not is what, if anything, less than a serious risk to health would justify
an injunction. Indeed, Nunn J. describes a serious risk to health as "one
of the strongest [situations] which would warrant the exercise of the
Court's discretion," 61 intimating that less strong situations would also
justify an injunction.
Another very serious consequence of reducing the issue of a remedy
to the question of a serious risk to health is that Nunn J. never considers
the issue of whether a less severe remedy than a permanent, total injunction
would be appropriate. If this question was asked, at least two possible
approaches could have been legitimately pursued. One would be to explore
the possibility of a conditional injunction. In this way, for example,
concerns about the method of application could be addressed. Thus the
court could enjoin the spraying unless it was carried out in accordance
with any stipulations the court thought appropriate. The second way would
be to substitute damages for the injunction. The court would in effect
be saying that while the plaintiffs will be wronged, in all the circumstances
59 Supra, note 2 at 348.
60 See Salmon, supra, note 50. The syllogism takes this form:
If a serious risk to health exists, then an injunction should issue.
A serious risk to health does not exist.
.*. An injunction should not issue.
61 Supra note 2 at 348.
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an injunction should not be granted. They can be adequately treated
by a payment for prospective damages.62
Relief short of a permanent injunction would have been a disap-
pointment to the plaintiffs, but there would be vindication in establishing
the existence of a legal wrong. Also of vital practical importance would
be the likely effect on the question of costs. If costs are to follow the
event, then success on the merits of the cause of action is helpful.
VII. THE EVOLVING COMMON LAW: BURDENS OF PROOF
The Palmer case presented a novel problem to the court. The plaintiffs
desired to prevent a particular chemical compound, 2,4,5-T, with its
inevitable contaminant TCDD, from being sprayed. While this article has
attempted to show that the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed in some
measure regardless of the health risks associated with 2,4,5-T and TCDD,
it is also fair to say that the case in effect put the chemicals on trial.
As Mr. Justice Nunn himself concluded:
This matter thus reduces itself now to the single question. Have the plaintiffs
offered sufficient proof that there is aserious risk of health and that such serious
risk of health will occur if the spraying of the substances here is permitted to
take place?6
3
Notice that, for the trial judge, the sine qua non of the case is whether
or not a serious health risk exists. In order to make an affirmative finding,
"the plaintiffs [must offer] sufficient proof." As Nunn J. says elsewhere:
"The complete burden of proof, of course, rests upon the plaintiffs
throughout for all issues asserted by them." 64 In short, if the plaintiffs
say these chemicals are unsafe, let them prove it.
The problem with this approach is captured, perhaps unwittingly,
by the learned trial judge when he states:
62 See Shelfer v. London Electric Lighting Co. (1894), [1895] 1 Ch. 287 at 322-23, where
Smith LJ. deals with when damages should be a substitute for an injunction:
(1) If the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small,
(2) And is one which is capable of being estimated in money,
(3) And is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment,
(4) And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an
injunction....
See generally, A.M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982) at 559-
60; J.G. Flemming, The Law of Torts, 6th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at 412-13. Of importance
in considering this alternative are the Canadian counterparts to Lord Cairns Act of 1858. This
authorizes the court to award damages in addition to or in substitution for an injunction: see,
eg., Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 223, s. 21; Judicature Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 2, ss 38(1), 2(7).
63 Supra, note 2 at 348.
64 Ibid at 347.
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As to the wider issues relating to the dioxin issue, it hardly seems necessary to
state that a court of law is no forum for the determination of matters of science.
Those are for science to determine, as facts, following the traditionally accepted
methods of scientific inquiry. A substance neither does nor does not create a risk
to health by court decree and it would be foolhardy for a court to enter such
an enquiry. If science itself is not certain, a court cannot resolve the conflict and
make the thing certain.65 [Emphasis added.]
This translates into saying that if the plaintiffs must prove the human
health dangers of the chemicals, but the scientists themselves have not
agreed or settled this issue in scientific terms, then the plaintiffs lose.
Scientific uncertainty results in the benefit of the doubt being given to
the chemicals. In a court of law, chemicals are presumptively innocent.
The classical analysis illustrated by the Palmer case values the right to
produce and use chemicals over possible adverse human health effects.
As Nunn J.'s view demonstrates, the court is normally only concerned
with the probable and not the possible.66
At one point, the learned trial judge refers to well-established
principles of law and to the court "varying and altering them to adjust
to an ever-changing society." 67 This of course is a reference to the fact
that the common law system cannot be static and purely precedent-
bound. The common law must be capable of evolution and growth to
accommodate new circumstances and new perceptions. One aspect of
this growth must be with burdens of proof concerning suspect chemicals
whose consequences are uncertain. Incomplete information must not work
in favour of the companies that produce chemicals. Who gave chemicals
priority over human health concerns? Surely no one did so advertently.
One response to the burden of proof problem would be to enact
new legislation. In legislating a reversal, democratically elected persons
adjust the burdens to reflect their perceptions of the appropriate balance
to be struck between what might be characterized as industrial and
developmental concerns, and health and environmental concerns. Indeed,
included in the aftermath of the Palmer decision was such a suggestion.
Charles Caccia, at that time federal Minister of Environment, publicly
stated that such legislative action should be taken, and indeed argued
that there was room for the courts themselves to put some form of burden
of proof on the defendant in the case of the threat of potential con-
65 Ibid at 348.
66 Ibid at 349.
67 Ibid at 348.
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tamination from toxic chemicals.6 8 Perhaps if the Liberal government
had not shortly thereafter been defeated such legislation would have been
introduced. However, even if such legislation had materialized, at least
one problem is evident. How far would Parliament press its constitutional
ability to deal with common law causes of action? Burdens of proof
in private legal proceedings would appear prima facie to be matters of
property and civil rights in the provinces, under provincial legislative
jurisdiction as a result of section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 186769
Perhaps ten provinces in addition to or in substitution for the federal
government would need to legislate to achieve the desired outcome.
While a legislated response may be appropriate, it is not necessary.
Not only will legislative action be slow in coming, if it ever does, but
legislation may very well not represent the best approach. This might
be so because burdens of proof in common law actions are, like the
causes of action themselves, the product of judicial law making. By and
large judges over the centuries have responded to new needs within their
elaborate self-made system. This has been done on a situation-by-situation,
case-by-case, incremental basis. Occasionally the incremental advance
has been more or less revolutionary, 70 but it is always tempered by the
exigencies of the case at hand. In my view, a Palmer-style situation,
which requires proof in the face of uncertainty and in which it is virtually
impossible to demonstrate harm, requires a judicial reversal of the burden
of proof.
Such a judicial response is not out of keeping with developing
precedent. Apt analogies exist. Before illustrating by reference to two
high-level decisions, one overriding point should be made: proof in a
legal sense need not equate to proof in a scientific sense. Science requires
demonstration of a very high order before accepting a statement as proven
and true; something must be virtually certain. Law, on the other hand,
normally deals in probabilities. Because of the fundamental nature of
law, the need to adjust human relations, and the need to reach a final
decision in the case at hand, law injects policy and value considerations
68 See, ag., C. Caccia, Minister of the Environment, Gov't of Canada, Address (Environmental
Law Section, Canadian Bar Association, 25 January 1984), esp. at 7.
69 (U.K.), 30 & 32 Vict., c. 3. See ag., MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd (1976), 66 D.L.R.
(3d) I (S.C.C.).
70 See, eg., Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932), [1932] A.C. 562; The Wagon Mound (No. 1) (1961),
[1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.); Hedley, Bryne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd (1963), [1964] A.C.
465; R v. Sauh Ste Marie (1978), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299; Saskatchewan Wheat Pool v. Gov't of
Canada (1983), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205.
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into decisions. 7' This is how and why law evolves. Unlike the natural
and physical sciences, law represents the best compromise we can
practically fashion to govern our relations with each other. It is not an
objective system of verifiable 'truths'. 72
Thus the proposition being advanced is this: it is appropriate for
a judge to respond to cases involving suspect chemicals in the face of
scientific uncertainty by finding the chemicals presumptively unsafe,
despite the inability of the plaintiff to demonstrate the likelihood of harm,
unless the defendant is able to prove on the balance of probabilities
that the chemicals are safe. Note that this view circumvents problems
of causation in fact, but does, in its reference to 'suspect' chemicals,
retain a need for some minimal rational connection between the chemicals
and harm; there must be some reason to regard the chemicals as unsafe
before reversing the burden of proof. Arguably, without such a connection,
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,73 with its
reference to the fundamental principles of justice, might be offended.74
Before saying more about these problems, consider two Anglo-Canadian
71 See, eg., H.L. Korn, "Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts" (1966) 66 Colum. L. Rev.
1080 esp. at 1093-95. Korn states, at 1093-94:
A further, and perhaps the most fundamental, source of difficulty in technical fact determination
is that the law and the scientific knowledge to which it refers often serve different purposes.
Concerned with ordering men's conduct in accordance with certain standards, values, and
societal goals, the legal system is a prescriptive and normative one dealing with the "ought
to be". Much scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is purely descriptive; its "laws" seek
not to control or judge the phenomena of the real world, but to describe and explain them
in neutral terms.
He notes, at 1094, that in a variety of cases "the law deals with a subject within the special
province of one of the sciences but utilizes a concept which has been skewed from analogous
scientific ones by policy and value considerations which do not concern the scientists." He concludes,
at 1095, that "the formulation of rules of law may reflect deliberate judgements concerning the
extent to which scientific knowledge should be determinative." The M'Naghten test for insanity
is a classic example of 'policy and value ingredients' being superimposed on psychiatric learning
to produce a legal concept which has no counterpart in the psychiatrist's conceptual system.
See also M.R. Gelpe & A.D. Tarlock, "The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental
Decisionmaking" (1974) 48 S. Cal. L. Rev. 371, esp. at 385-88; H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honor6,
Causation in The Law (1959) esp. ch. IlI: "Causation and Responsibility"; T.F. Schrecker, Political
Economy of Environmental Hazards (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1984) esp. ch.
2: "The Politics of Science."
I am indebted for much of the material in this section of the paper to my colleague at Dalhousie
Law School, Prof. Stephen Mills. He ably prepared a written submission on this issue which was
presented to Mr. Justice Nunn.
72 I do not overlook the fact that scientific truths held at one time are later proven wrong
or replaced by better hypotheses. In this sense scientific truths are not absolute but rather the
subject of agreement amongst scientists at a particular time. The point of science, however, is
that it purports to describe reality in an objective way that can be demonstrated to be accurate.
73 Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 being Schedule B of the Canada Ac 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
74 Gelpe & Tarlock, supra, note 71 at 373, refer to a similar "due process" problem in the
American Bill of Rights, U.S. Const. amend IX.
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cases where, for reasons of policy, common law'judges have held
defendants liable despite the failure of the plaintiffs to prove causation
in fact.
The first of these cases is Cook v. Lewis.75 Here A was struck by
birdshot immediately after the defendants B and C discharged their guns.
The jury found that A was shot by one of the defendants but was unable
to say which one it was. Despite this finding the Supreme Court of Canada
held that liability could be imposed on both B and C. As a result, liability
was imposed on someone who did not cause the harm to the plaintiff.
Several explanations for this were given by the various members of the
Court. In general, however, the Court seemed to base its decision on
two factors: the defendants' conduct was such that it was impossible
for the plaintiff to show who caused him harm; and both defendants
had been at fault, and as between an innocent plaintiff and a defendant
who was at fault, it was proper to assign responsibility to the defendant
even if he had not actually caused the harm.
In the second case, McGhee v. National Coal Board,76 the plaintiff
had contracted dermatitis after working in the defendant's brick works.
He alleged that the defendant had materially increased the risk of
dermatitis by not installing showers. It was conceded by the defendant
that it had breached its duty of care to the plaintiff by not installing
showers, but the defendant contended that as a result of the medical
debate over the causes of dermatitis the plaintiff had not proved on a
balance of probabilities that the failure to provide the washing facilities
caused the harm. An alternative cause was suggested: working in the
kiln had caused the dermatitis, and since the defendant had not been
negligent in assigning the plaintiff to this work, it was not liable.
The majority of the court acknowledged that the state of medical
evidence made it impossible to prove that the defendant's fault had caused
the plaintiffs harm. Nonetheless, the court held that the defendant was
liable. Lord Wilberforce stated:
[T]he question remains whether a pursuer must necessarily fail if, after he has
shown a breach of duty, involving an increase of risk of disease, he cannot positively
prove that this increase of risk caused or materially contributed to the disease
while his employers cannot positively prove the contrary.... [T]here is an
appearance of logic in the view that the pursuer, on whom the onus lies, should
fail.... The question is whether we should be satisfied in factual situations like
the present, with this logical approach. In my opinion, there are further considerations
of importance. First, it is a sound principal that where a person has, by breach
of duty of care, created a risk, and injury occurs within the area of that risk,
the loss should be borne by him unless he shows that it had some other cause.
75 (1951), [1952] 1 D.L.R. 1 (S.C.C.).
76 (1972), [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008 (H.L.).
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Secondly, from the evidential point of view, one may ask, why should a man
who is able to show that his employer should have taken certain precautions,
because without them there is a risk, or an added risk, of injury or disease, and
who in fact sustains exactly that injury or disease, have to assume the burden
of proving more: namely, that it was the addition to the risk, caused by the breach
of duty, which caused or materially contributed to the injury? In many cases of
which the present is typical, this is impossible to prove,just because honest medical
opinion cannot segregate the causes of an illness between compound causes. And
if one asked which of the parties, the workman or the employers should suffer
from this inherent evidential difficulty, the answer as a matter of policy or justice
should be that it is the creator of the risk who, ex hypothesi, must be taken to
have foreseen the possibility of damage, who should bear its consequences.
... [T]o bridge the evidential gap by inference seems to me something of
a fiction, since it was precisely this inference which the medical expert declined
to make. But I find in the cases quoted an analogy which suggests the conclusion
that, in the absence of proof that the culpable condition had, in the result, no
effect, the employers should be liable for an injury, squarely within the risk which
they created and that they, not the pursuer, should suffer the consequence of the
impossibility, foreseeably inherent in the nature of his injury, of segregating the
precise consequence of their default.77
Lord Reid also noted that "the legal concept of causation is not
based on logic or philosophy. It is based on the practical way in which
the ordinary man's mind works in the every-day affairs of life."78
Perhaps the most telling summation of the lessons to be learned
from Cook v. Lewis and McGhee v. National Coal Board was made by
Ernest Weinrib:
The allocation of the burden of proof is not always to be the plaintiff's, but it
must be subservient to compelling requirements of justice. And the primarily
evidential nature of cause in fact should not render it impervious to the considerations
of policy, purpose and value.7
9
This approach to causation is illustrated in a closely analogous situations
to Palmer by the now-famous United States Court of Appeal decision
in Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency.80 A significant
issue in this case involved discharges from the defendant's taconite
processing plant and the question of whether the discharges should be
enjoined. Proof of harm fell below the normal balance of probabilities
threshold, and yet the Court of Appeal issued an injunction against the
discharge. Circuit Judge Bright reasoned:
In assessing probabilities in this case, it cannot be said that the probability of
harm is more likely than not. Moreover, the level of prrobability does not readily
convert into a prediction of consequences. On this record it cannot be forecast
77 Ibid at 1012-13.
78 Ibid at 1011.
79 EJ. Weinrib, "A Step Forward in Factual Causation" (1975) 38 Mod. L. Rev. 518.
80 (1975), 514 F.2d 492 (U.S.C.A., 8th Cir.).
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that the rates of cancer will increase from drinking Lake Superior water or breathing
Silver Bay air. The best that can be said is that the existence of this asbestos
contaminant in air and water gives rise to a reasonable medical concern for the
public health. The public exposure to asbestos fibers in air and water creates some
health risk. Such a contaminant should be removed.... [T]he existence of this
risk to the public justifies an injunction decree requiring abatement of the health
hazard on reasonable terms as a precautionary and preventive measure to protect
the public health. 81
Later, Bright J. again relates the remedy to possible future harm. He
states, "In fashioning relief in a case such as this involving a possibility
of future harm, a court should strike a proper balance between the benefits
conferred and the hazards created by Reserve's facility."8 2 Still later he
notes that the probabilities of harm with respect to water "must be deemed
low for they do not rest on a history of past health harm attributable
to ingestion but on a medical theory implicating the ingestion of asbestos
fibers as a causative factor in increasing the rates of gastrointestinal
cancer among asbestos workers." While with respect to air there is "a
higher degree of proof... the hazard cannot be measured in terms of
predictability, but the assessment must be made without direct proof."
Bright J. tells us the hazards "can be measured in only the most general
terms as a concern for the public health resting upon a reasonable medical
theory." He notes, though, that "[s]erious consequences could result if
the hypothesis on which it is based should ultimately prove true." The
U.S. Court of Appeals concludes that "[a] court is not powerless to act
in these circumstances."83 While granting the injunction, the court lessened
its impact on the defendant by taking into account factors such as harm
not being shown to be "imminent or certain." 84
Considering the Palmer case in light of the Reserve Mining approach
and my suggestion with respect to burdens of proof, it is fair to comment
that a different court, perhaps with different evidence, could come to
a different result. Taking Nunn J.'s findings at face value, we can see
that he accepted that "TCDD is one of the most toxic chemicals known
to man"85 and that in animal studies TCDD was found to be "among
other things, fetotoxic, teratagenic, carcinogenic and to cause immuno-
logical deficiencies, enzymatic changes, liver problems and the like." 86
Considerable evidence was adduced of studies involving humans, some
81 Ibid at 520.
82 Ibid at 535.
83 Ibid at 536. All of the quotations in this paragraph come from the same source.
84 Ibid at 537.
85 Supra, note 2 at 350.
86 Ibid at 352.
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of which indicated a positive finding of harm to humans, but the trial
judge accepted that, while these studies were likely flawed, "in all these
cases the exposure was massive, either through accident or industrial
exposure or the Vietnam War."87 He concludes that this evidence is "not
of significant probative value in light of the actual low possible exposure
here."88 For him "[t]he key to the use of all these [carcinogenic or otherwise
toxic substances] is dosage."89 "[T]here are no-effect levels and safe levels
for humans and wildlife for each of these substances [2,4-D, 2,4,5-T
and TCDD]."90
If it can be said that TCDD in large or experimental levels is harmful
to animals (and surely this is an unassailable proposition), what is it
reasonable to conclude about its effect on humans at low doses? The
'legal' answer given by Nunn J. in Palmer is to the effect that nothing
can be concluded. The first proposition does not prove the second, and
hence the plaintiffs lose. Utilizing the test and terminology proposed earlier
in this section of the article, the first proposition (harmful effects in animals
at large or experimental level doses) makes TCDD a 'suspect chemical'.
In other words, we may not know what its effect is on humans, especially
at low dosages, but there is a sufficient, reliable body of knowledge
of its effects on animals to suspect that it may be harmful to humans.
This should be enough, as it seemed to be in Reserve Mining, to warrant
presumptively enjoining the use of TCDD in light of the potentially serious
human consequences if it is in fact harmful and the relatively incon-
sequential economic effects on the defendant if it has to use alternate
techniques (for example, another herbicide such as Roundup, or manual
weeding). This position is merely presumptive since the defendant could
lead sufficient evidence during the trial to prove no likely human health
hazards. Even if the proponent of the chemical failed in this regard,
the injunction could always be subject to reconsideration in light of new
studies and new evidence. It may be difficult, and expensive, to prove
a substance more likely safe than not. But as between putting this burden
on those passively exposed to the chemicals and those actively using
them, where, as a matter ofjudicial policy, should the burden lie? Similarly,
as between presuming a suspect chemical safe and presuming it harmful,
which is the wiser and more appropriate judicial response?
87 Ibid
88 Ibid at 353.
89 Ibid
90 Ibid at 354.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Palmer v. NSFI is in many ways a startling case. It sits at the cutting
edge of the development of common law approaches to environmental
problems. The case raises many issues important to environmental
litigation; it illustrates environmental law in microcosm. This article has
focused on the gains in environmental litigation made in Palmer and
on ways in which further advances could and should have been made.
Of particular credit to Nunn J. are the views expressed on class actions
and the theoretical adoption of trespass to land as the basis for an
environmental action. Particularly flawed, in my view, is his insistence
upon the need to find "a serious risk to [human] health"9' or a strong
probability of harm92 before finding that a nuisance has been proven
or that injunctive relief is appropriate. Similarly, his failure to deal with
the evidence that spraying would result in drift of herbicides to the
plaintiffs' lands (and so amount to trespass to land) seems extraordinary.
A variety of other criticisms might be directed at the reasons for judgment
in Palmer, but the litany of issues would considerably expand the scope
of this article.93 Suffice it to say that silence about other aspects of the
decision should not be taken as acquiesence.
91 Ibid at 348; also expressed as "a serious risk of health" at 345.
92 One aspect of the reasons which deserves greater attention is the relationship between
the concepts of probability and risk.
93 Other issues of note include:
(1) The nature and value of scientific inquiry and its relation to law. Judge Nunn, supra,
note 2 at 352, seems to discount animal studies because "the doses are extremely high."
He does not seem to appreciate that the doses are high because the researchers are interested
in whether there is any reaction to the chemicals at all, and if so, what. It appears that
only small-dose, and therefore long-term, experiments would be meaningful to him. Again,
does he appreciate the difficulty and expense of doing this? Similarly, does the court appreciate
the inherent problems in doing retrospective epidemiological studies, such as those performed
by Drs. Tung and Hardell? Because they depend upon human memories and assessments,
they are probably all to some extent flawed. Much has been written on these themes lately:
see supra, note 71 and material cited in references.
(2) The relationship between the court's role in private/public interest ligitation and regulatory
decisions. Nunn J. describes, at supra, note 2 at 300, the Palmer case as taking on "the
nature of an appeal from the decision of the regulatory agency [i.e., Agriculture Canada,
which registers pesticides for use in Canada, after advice from Health and Welfare Canada]
and any such approach through the courts ought to be discouraged in its infancy." But
what is the nature of that regulatory process? Are the public involved and if so, how? (They
are not at present). How reliable is that process? Why ought a regulatory decision, made
for one purpose, foreclose a fresh inquiry by a different body for a different purpose? It
is like saying to a civil court that a defendant is not liable in damages because a criminal
court has acquitted him, or vice versa.
(3) Why is credence given to an unexplained regulatory process in Canada and the United
Kingdom, while those in the United States, Sweden and other countries, which reached opposite
conclusions, are discarded? See Palmer, ibid at 350.
(4) The admissibility and relevance of the defendant's previous conduct. The plaintiffs led
evidence as to how the defendant carried out its spraying operations in 1982 on sites not
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Perhaps the most long-term problem illustrated by Palmer relates
to the way in which the court system should handle issues of scientific
uncertainty. Science can provide many answers and present most legally
significant cause-and-effect relationships on the basis of a reliable estimate
of probability. In other situations, however, such as those involving human
exposure to small doses of toxic chemicals, science may not be able
to provide answers today with any degree of certainty. The necessary
experiments may not have been done, or may not be economically or
covered by the interim injunction. This included evidence of violations of the requirements
set down in the N.S. Department of Environment permits and the legally significant instructions
on the labels of the herbicide. Nunn J. ibid at 351 said "this is clearly not relevent as
well as not admissible under the exclusionary rule of similar fact evidence." Not only was
evidence of prior conduct inadmissible, but "the defendant is entitled to ask the court to
assume that any spraying will be done in accordance with these directions [in the labels
on the spray containers]" and that the "defendant is further entitled to ask for the assumption
that its conifer release program will be properly managed and that all scientific skill and
knowledge usually associated with such a program will be used" (ibid at 351). Ironically,
Nunn J. cites as authority for this approach Attorney General v. Corporation of Nottingham
(1904), [1904] 1 Ch. 673. There a quia timet injunction was sought to prevent the defendant
from using as a smallpox hospital a building it had recently erected, on the grounds that
such a hospital would be both a public and a private nuisance. In the course of using terminology
virtually identical to that used by Nunn J., Farwell J. went on to say, at 677, that the defendants
"are entitled in the present case to the benefit of the observation that the hospital has been
open and has received patients for the last six months, during the last half of which it
has been full, and that no mischief has at present arisen therefrom." Farwell J. also points
out that evidence of what happened with other hospitals was heard by him and notes authority,
with which he disagrees, that the plaintiffs "might have shown what in fact was the effect
in the neighbourhood of the only other hospitals under the same conditions" (per Cotton
LJ., in Hill v. Metropolitan Asylum District (1880), 42 L.T. 212 (C.A.) at 215; appeal (1882),
47 L.T. 29 (H.L.). In other words, despite some controversy about whether what other hospital
operators did at other hospitals is admissible, the authority cited by Nunn J. in fact looked
at the conduct of this defendant for the previous six months as an aid in determining what
it would do in the future. For a modem statement of the similar fact rule see Phipson on
Evidence, 13th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1982) at 184 et seq., which states that subject
to two exceptions, "evidence of facts or transactions similar to the fact or transaction directly
in issue is admissible if it is logically probative, that is if it is logically relevant in determining
the matter which is in issue, and is not otherwise excluded, ag. by the rule against hearsay."
Phipson points out the court has a discretion to, and should, reject such evidence unless
it is "reasonably conclusive" and would not raise a "difficult and doubtful controversy of
precisely the same kind" (at 184). As an example, Phipson at 223 notes Sattin v. National
Union Bank (1978), 122 SJ. 367 where the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's appeal
from a trial judge's refusal to admit evidence of another occasion when jewellery lodged
at the bank had been discovered missing. The plaintiff was claiming damages for the loss
of a diamond that had been deposited as security with the bank and was using the similar
fact evidence to rebut the suggestion that the defendant used reasonable safeguards for securing
customer's property. See also Mood Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. De Wolfe Ltd (1975), [1976]
Ch. 119 (C.A.).
(5) As already indicated, a critical factor for the trial judge was the quantity of TCDD
in the Esteron 3-3E proposed to be sprayed. The legally permissible level of TCDD
contamination in 2,4,5-T in Canada is 0.1 parts per million (100 parts per billion), yet
Nunn J. accepted that the 2,4,5-T to be used by the defendant would have only 0.01 p.p.m.
(10 p.p.b.) TCDD, 10 times less than the regulatory limit. There were containers of Esteron
3-3E remaining from the previous spray season at the defendant's warehouse, but no evidence
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ethically possible. Indeed, science itself has its own limitations. How should
a court treat these problems? There may be no one way to deal with
all problems, but at least where the use of suspect chemicals is concerned,
plaintiffs ought not to fail because they cannot demonstrate, in the wake
of uncertain science, that discernable harm is more probable than not.
If there is a rational basis to think harm is more than speculative, such
as by virtue of scientifically acceptable animal experiments, then the
burden should rest with those seeking to impose risk to justify doing
so. Why should the common law prefer herbicides to humankind?
was led of the TCDD content of these containers by sampling them. Rather, the only evidence
led by the defendant of TCDD content was Exhibit D-70. This was a letter written by
a salesman for Dow Chemical Canada to a lawyer for the defendant "indicating that from
information supplied by the laboratory where the product was formulated [in Midland,
Michigan], the TCDD content was 'non-detectable at .01 parts per million."' (at 311). The
2,4,5-T had been manufactured at least four years before and the analysis provided was
from sample batches. In other words, the trial judge accepted as proof of the level of TCDD
contamination a letter sent by a salesman based on information provided to him by a person
or persons not before the court based on tests performed by persons unknown and not before
the court and without details of what tests were performed. Is this not hearsay evidence
of the worst sort? What of the so-called "best evidence" rule, at least in the sense that
the "non-production [of the best evidence, here, an analysis of the Esteron 3-3E at the
defendant's warehouse] may be matter for comment or affect the weight of that which
is produced." See Phipson at 70. And what of "the chief illustration of the 'best evidence'
maxim ... the rule which demands that the contents of a document must, in the absence
of legal excuse, be proved by primary and not by secondary or substitutional evidence"
(Phipson at 72)?
(6) The trial judge awarded costs against the plaintiffs, although as a result of negotiations
between the parties the defendant did not press to enforce this right - a liability estimated
in a range approaching $250,000. This liability was imposed without hearing the parties
on the issue of costs, and represents a very severe deterrent to others interested in pursuing
public interest litigation. Suffice it to say that courts have a discretion in respect of the
award of costs, and that judges have relieved unsuccessful plaintiffs of liability for the
defendant's costs where novel questions of law or issues of public importance have been
involved. See eg. Dalhousie University v. City of Halifax (1979), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 643 (C.A.),
at 676; Chater v. City of Dartmouth (1975), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 34 (S.C.) at 61; Rosenberg v.
Grand River Conservation Authority (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 643 (Ont. H.C.) at 652; Shore
v. CantwelletaL (1975),21 N.S.R. (2d) 288 (S.C.) at 297; Re Nanticoke Ratepayers'Association
and Environmental Assessment Board (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 722 (Ont. H.C.) at 723-33;
R. Anand & I.G. Scott, "Financing Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making"
(1982) 60 Can. B. Rev. 81 esp. at 96-100; Schrecker, supra, note 71 at 77.
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